The History and Activities of the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Poland 1944-1989 as a contribution to research on the role of the secret service in systemic transformation

Die Geschichte und die Aktivitäten des Ministeriums für öffentliche Sicherheit und des Ministerium des Inneren in Polen 1944-89 als Beitrag zur Rolle der Geheimdienste in der Systemtransformation.

Von Tytus Jaskułowski

 

Abstract:

Die Zielsetzung des vorliegenden Textes besteht in der Darstellung und Analyse der Schlüsselelemente der Tätigkeit der beiden für die innere Sicherheit zuständigen Ministerien in der Volksrepublik Polen zwischen 1944 und 1989. Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass sie Teil eines totalitären Regierungssystems waren, soll der Text einen Beitrag zur Beantwortung von Fragen über ihre Rolle bei der anschließenden Demokratisierung und dem Übergang zu einem demokratischen System leisten.

Abstract ENG: The aim of the text is to present and analyse the key elements of the operation of both ministries responsible for internal security in People’s Republic of Poland between 1944-1989. Because of the fact, that they were part of a totalitarian system of government the mentioned Draft is intended to become a contribution to answering questions about their role in the subsequent democratization and transition to a democratic system.

Abstract GER: Die Zielsetzung des vorliegenden Textes besteht in der Darstellung und Analyse der Schlüsselelemente der Tätigkeit der beiden für die innere Sicherheit zuständigen Ministerien in der Volksrepublik Polen zwischen 1944 und 1989. Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass sie Teil eines totalitären Regierungssystems waren, soll der Text einen Beitrag zur Beantwortung von Fragen über ihre Rolle bei der anschließenden Demokratisierung und dem Übergang zu einem demokratischen System leisten.

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It is significant that in the context of comparing in polish public debate after 1989, connected with mentioning the broader political system or relations between non-European countries, especially in Latin America with the political system of the Warsaw Pact countries in the twentieth century, the emphasis was not only placed on general political institutions, but mainly on the figures exercising real power. The first and foremost reference here is to the rule of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, described even as worse than General Augusto Pinochet. Somewhere in the background, above all in the context of contemporary economic relations one of the authors asked also whether Poland wanted to rediscover policy, economy or history of Secret Services in Latin America.

For obvious reasons, the following contribution will not answer the last question mentioned above. If it does, however, it will do so as a kind of reverse, only because it wants to present to the English or Spanish-speaking reader the functioning of one of the most important instruments of the state defined as People's Poland, that is, the secret services, which, in the opinion of the Author, were crucial in bringing about the systemic transformation in 1989. Undoubtedly, this instrument was led by specific people, such as General Jaruzelski. This fact, however, does not of itself answer the question of how the security service system in Poland came into being, how it functioned until 1989 and how it influenced the functioning of Polish politics after 1989. Rediscovering Latin America should, in the author's understanding, therefore begin by presenting answers to these questions, in order to contribute to an easier future comparison between the activities of the Polish Ministry of the Interior and the special services of other countries, not only Latin American ones.

Determinants of the functioning of the security apparatus in the People's Republic of Poland 1944-1989

It is trivial to state that the development of the security system in Poland after 1944 differed from the activities of the secret services in Latin America due to a number of geopolitical and systemic differences. However, understanding these dissimilarities is crucial to the presentation of what happened during the polish transition of 1989. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Poland was a sovereign country with a historically established identity. Communism as a system was not just something alien or accepted by a small part of society. The Communist Party, regarded as an agent of the Soviet Union, was furthermore fought against by the organs of the state as an organisation threatening the sovereignty of the country. In spite of the defeat of the war and the occupation, moreover, resistance structures were developed there, in which, for example, the communist partisans did not play a leading role, or were fought by other underground organisations.

In the moment, where Germany was defeated and the Nazi occupation ended, the armed forces of another totalitarian state - the USSR, entered Polish territory. They did not intend to recreate the former political system, but to fight against it. This, in turn, meant conflict with the existing former resistance movement and a society reluctant to the communist idea. In the first years after the end of the war, therefore, a situation arose in which the secret services and army of the USSR, in conjunction with the local security apparatus, which was only just being built up, took on, at least until 1953, the role of a force which physically, through terror and violence, took control of the state.

The takeover of power did not, however, imply control over society or the complete elimination of political opponents. All the time there were strong Catholic Church structures in the country, supported by the majority of the population. From 1944 until at least 1949 the civil war took place. Moreover, economic problems meant that, throughout the history of People's Poland, there were violent social protests, especially in the years 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980, at a rhythm of 6-7 years. The security organs could pacify them, but they had no chance of liquidating them. This was best demonstrated by the opposition trade union Solidarity, which emerged in 1980 with 11 million members. The Communist Party at its peak had only 3 million members, out of a country of around 38 million people.

Fighting political opponents or the work of the secret police could not, therefore, look like it did in dictatorships that came about as a result of a revolution from below supported sincerely by the people. Poland's geopolitical situation was admittedly unchanged. It was surrounded by other and more repressive communist states. But already the first small revolution after Stalin's death, i.e. the events of 1956, showed that there had to be relative independence in internal politics in Poland, even if formally the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was to reign. From the point of view of the secret services, this meant not only involving them and their leadership in the political struggle at the expense of marginalising the Communist Party. Something else seem to be more important. Since it was clear that society would never accept communism, even at the cost of repression, there had to be an extremely flexible approach to the fight against the political opposition, since it was an element of the system that had to be lived with somehow, despite the lack of mutual acceptance.

Secondly, the aim of this struggle was the survival not even of the system as a whole, but of selected social groups within its institutions, in particular the secret police. So its aim was not only to protect the party from its enemies, but above all to protect itself.

This line of thinking was all the more developed the more it became clear that Poland's economic situation would never be the same as in Western Europe. From the 1970s onwards, a new generation of functionaries appeared in the security apparatus, born after the war, pragmatic, rejecting ideology and focused on securing their own financial and political position. They understood, especially from the rise of Solidarity in 1980, that even its delegitimisation would not mean defeating a society reluctant to rule. The security organs were therefore in a position not only to understand this fact, but also to have the courage to pass on the relevant information to their superiors, including suggestions that at some point some form of compromise must be reached between the authorities and the opposition. And the superiors were able to accept such arguments. The aforementioned flexibility, something unprecedented and impossible to find in the secret services of other socialist countries, e.g. East Germany, is crucial for understanding the operation of the Polish secret services in 1989, for example.

Structure and staffing

Unquestionably, organisational momentum and institutional stability were not something that characterised the Polish security apparatus. Between 1944 and 1989, nine different secret services operated in the People's Republic of Poland, starting with the Ministry of Public Security created by the pro-communist substitute for government established in the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1954, the already mentioned Ministry of Public Security operates, after which it is split into the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for Public Security. This division lasted only two years and was necessitated by identical changes in the Soviet Union. After the Committee is abolished, it becomes part of the Ministry of the Interior until 1989. Besides, there are also separate military services as a unit of armed Forces.

The basic organisational unit remained the departments responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, combating hostile activities, surveillance of the church, industry, and agriculture. Alongside these, there were, treated as auxiliary, the departments of operational technology, observation, ciphers, correspondence control and archives. The development of the political situation additionally led to the creation of new units, e.g. the department for the protection of officers or the office of studies, dealing with combating the opposition and crimes, mainly economic, committed by officers. The work of the various departments was furthermore linked by the so-called services, which also coordinated their activities. These were the security service, responsible for the overall situation in the country, and maintaining autonomy, the intelligence and counterintelligence service.

The frequency of structural changes went hand in hand with personnel rotations. At the level of directors of key departments (intelligence and counterintelligence), it took place between 4 and 7 years, and when it came to their deputies, even more frequently. To this should be added the fact that the office of the Minister of Internal Affairs was held by 9 people during the whole history of Peoples Polish Republic. This was due to the position of the Interior Ministry in the political system.

The head of this ministry, regardless of the time when he took up his post, was always an active political player within the party, who in most cases ended his career with the arrival of its new leadership. In the People's Republic of Poland, as mentioned, political upheavals occurred at least every six years. Indeed, society was never as intimidated as in other socialist countries. This, in turn, led to relatively frequent protests and corresponding changes at the head of the party and also in the security apparatus, which had an extremely negative reputation since the terror of the Stalinist years. Since, it was difficult to offer a rapid improvement in material conditions in the country, changes in the security apparatus were the primary propaganda instrument for temporarily easing public sentiment, i.e. until the next solstice.

This was prompted by some spectacular escapes to the West by senior representatives of the same organisation, including the most important one by Colonel Józef Światło in December 1953. The effect of the changes was a reduction in terror, amnesties for political prisoners, reductions in the staff of the Security Ministry, networks of secret collaborators, and trials of officers - things unthinkable in other socialist countries. This fact also proved the distrust of the PZPR leadership regarding the exorbitant political ambitions of the Interior Ministry leadership, or their excessive loyalty to the USSR.

Regardless of their power, the employees of the Ministry of the Interior often acted as victims of current party politics, either as underlings or as those promoted to positions of prominence, but which deprived them of real influence. A relative unification of cooperation between the party boss and the secret services dates only from 1981, when the new leader of the PZPR and de facto head of state, general Jaruzelski appointed an officer loyal to himself, general Kiszczak, as minister. This meant not only that professional military officers took over nominal, though not necessarily actual, supervision of the civilian secret services, but also mutual surveillance of the civilian services by the military services and vice versa.

When discussing the concept of the personnel of the security ministries, one cannot fail to mention those in leadership positions. As in the case of those holding the most important state and party functions, they were mostly activists of pre-war illegal communist partie. Some of them had worked for the Soviet secret services. As a rule, they had several years of experience in the armed support of the communist idea before 1939, for example during the Spanish Civil War. They were often imprisoned in the USSR. Specific facts in their CVs, such as their background or previous crimes, furthermore made it easier to blackmail them themselves, or with their help, their superiors.

While the formations considered crucial, such as the intelligence services, were dominated by members of the former communist parties or their armed formations with the necessary experience of working abroad, for middle- and lower-ranking officers admission to the security services was one of the existing opportunities for social advancement. The less important a person's function, the lower the selection criteria applied. Rural and worker origin was declared by more than 93% of those admitted in the first phase of the Polish security apparatus.

Origin influenced the standards of behaviour in the services, or lack thereof. Fraud scandals, used on occasion for internal personnel battles within the ministry, were not unknown. Work ethic was non-existent. The percentage of party membership from 1957 to 1986 in the local structures as well as in the ministry's headquarters fell consistently: from 92 to 78% at field level and from 73% to 65% at central level. Since work in the ministry was seen as a way of quickly improving the standard of living, ideology in the ministry was a kind of ritual which was observed without too much importance being attached to it insofar as it was not needed for a trip to a lucrative foreign post. Some officers, especially at lower levels, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, engaged in strictly criminal activities . Alcoholism was rampant. Some officers, facing criminal consequences, cooperated with the democratic opposition and their supervision of dissidents sometimes degenerated into extremely loyal behaviour towards them.

Problems in the work of the Ministry of the Interior, which sometimes verged on the grotesque, did not, of course, mean that activities to control society ceased. Operational surveillance of the prosecutor's office and courts was carried out, the opposition was persecuted, foreigners were invigilated and secret murders were committed. Officers of the Ministry of the Interior also worked in secret jobs in many state institutions. The scale of these activities, however, was incomparable to that of other services in socialist countries. There were, for example, politically motivated staff reductions of up to 40 per cent, a situation that occurred in the People's Republic of Poland after the 1956 breakthrough. Events such as the administrative reform or the emergence of Solidarity obviously resulted in an increase in the number of officers. Only that in 1957 there were only 10,000, in 1985: 25,000, and in 1989: 24 thousand. This small number was further burdened by the low percentage of operational checks carried out. The Ministry of the Interior was only able to control 15% of correspondence in 1982, i.e. at the apogee of martial law.

Not much better was the number of personal sources of information. Their number, including all categories, and therefore also those who did not sign an undertaking to cooperate, fell from 85,000, caused primarily by the repressions of Stalinism, to over 8,000 in 1960, as a result of the political upheavals, to rise to 30,000 at the time of the emergence of Solidarity in 1980. While this trend continued until 1984 (69,000), during the controlled transition to a democratic system, the number of secret collaborators fell to 35,000 in 1989.

All the figures and events given earlier therefore beg the question of the main successes and failures of the polish secret services, as well as the key issue in the context of the post-1989 period, i.e. the estimated number of victims.

Successes, failures and victims

When discussing the successes and failures of the secret service, it is important to maintain an appropriate distance and criticism. Since many of the archives of Western European countries are still inaccessible, it will not always be possible to fully objectively define an event as a success or failure. Both concepts cannot always be also placed chronologically only in the period between 1944 and 1989. Indeed, they transcend this chronology. Furthermore, both concepts must be distinguished in their political and operational context. For both refer to the work of the secret police.

The primary success of the Polish services, it seems, was the transition from the political police model, typical of socialist countries, which pursues enemies of the communist party, to an essential intelligence institution which first and foremost intends to understand the environment in which it operates, and only then, optionally, to influence it by eliminating, or not, its enemies. Fighting the enemy, therefore, was not the primary objective of the work of the Ministry of the Interior, as opposed to providing competent and reliable information on the situation at home and abroad to the political leadership of the party and the state. On the other hand, this is what the Ministry's leadership expected, particularly from the 1980s onwards. A classic example of the above became the so-called “Group of Three”, an informal analytical body composed of officers overseeing intelligence and counterintelligence. There, for example, political analysts were drawn up for general Jaruzelski on the development of the situation in Poland, together with recommendations on how to conduct actions against the opposition.

Equally successful was the ability to maintain a narrative in society about the omnipotence of the Interior Ministry. Physical terror had been consistently limited since 1956, with exceptions such as direct outbursts of social discontent, e.g. in Dezember 1970 or after the imposition of martial law in 1981. Generally, however, although the authorities as such remained in the social assessment as something hostile, society had to function alongside them in some way. It was therefore sufficient, from the point of view of the secret service, to create the impression of omnipotence, but to use violence only in exceptional cases in order to maintain the citizen's conviction of the strength of the security apparatus, which, however, as long as one did not display a negative attitude towards it, did not interfere in social life.

The aforementioned tactics worked best in 1989. When the negotiations between the authorities and the opposition began, the Minister of the Interior was the chief negotiator. Moreover, he remained a member of the first non-communist government after September 1989. He retained control of the secret services and suffered no consequences for destroying files and evidence of crimes. What is more, in 1989 in Poland there were no occupations by the masses of society of the headquarters of the secret police, arrests of its leadership or demands for the immediate opening of files, as in other socialist countries. Society was passive and interested only in improving its own economic position. At the same time, this resulted in a huge success for the services post facum, i.e. the postponement of the vetting process for at least 10 years and the possibility of manipulating the political scene by presuming the agent past of, for example, politicians who were once opposition activists.

The next success resulted from the previous one. The flexibility of social control meant that, after 1945, there was no external military intervention in Poland of the kind seen in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. The biggest breakthrough, the Solidarity revolution of 1980-81, was blocked by the imposition of martial law, which was prepared by the Interior Ministry and the military themselves. And, most importantly, it came as a surprise to the unprepared opposition. The success of the relevant operation, which led not so much to the outlawing of Solidarity as to the destruction of the enormous level of social activity that had existed after 1980, led to talks between the authorities and the opposition in 1989.

Another significant political success was also the Fact that the services blocked those activities of other services of the socialist states that wanted to promote those circles in the Polish Communist Party that advocated a radical tightening of terror and increased dependence on the USSR. Moreover, the services and the state leadership accurately assessed the changes in the USSR since 1985, i.e. since Mikhail Gorbachev took power. They were aware that there was, from that moment on, an acceptance of radical political reform, as the necessary economic transformation was not possible without it. Acceptance of Soviet ideas of change influenced this country's support for the aforementioned 'round table' talks, i.e. negotiations between the authorities and the opposition. In those countries, in turn, where there was no understanding of Gorbachev's policy, such as East Germany, the communist regimes lost all power without the possibility of either retaining influence or going unpunished.

Examining operational successes, it is necessary to mention the possibilities of obtaining agents inside opposition circles and the clergy of the Catholic Church. Regardless of the controversy over the credibility of the information received, the Polish services had secret collaborators within Vatican structures, such as Father Konrad Hejmo. They conducted for many years a so-called operational dialogue with priests important for the activities of the Polish opposition, most likely due to their awareness of the moral abuses of these priests (Henryk Jankowski, Cardinal Henryk Gulbinowicz). At the same time, they had agents who were couriers between Solidarity activists and Polish émigré circles abroad, or opposition activists (Maleszka) Agents were also positioned in Polish sections of foreign radio stations such as Radio Free Europe, who were later used, more or less successfully, for propaganda activities (Czechowicz).

From the point of view of strictly counterintelligence and intelligence work, noteworthy were cases of officers with changed identities being introduced into Vatican structures (Turowski) or Western European offices (Kaczmarek), proven cases of illegal penetration of foreign embassies, obtaining information on the latest types of weaponry in the USA (Zacharski) or, most difficult to verify, the possession of alleged agents in the Israeli secret services, with which, of course, researchers of Israeli intelligence disagree (Lucjan Levi). Relatively good anti-terrorist protection should also have been mentioned, as there had in fact been only one spectacular attack in Poland up to 1989, i.e. the attempted assassination of the leader of the 'Black September' organisation, Abu Daud. This was also due to the cynical interests of the services with armed organisations in the Middle East, which, at the price of support in arms purchases, refrained from armed actions on Polish territory. The aforementioned cynicism was significant insofar as, at the time of the beginning of the systemic changes in 1989, the Polish services were not reluctant to immediately change alliances and start cooperating with, for example, the CIA or Mossad, which, after all, had previously been fought against.

What were, in the above context, the failures recorded in the Polish services. From a political point of view, the senseless political murders of students, high school graduates or priests involved in helping the opposition were to be regarded as such. We are talking here about death of Stanisław Pyjas, Grzegorz Przemyk or Father Jerzy Popiełuszko. Even if, many years later, some of them (Pyjas) are not judged in recent publications to have been caused by the secret services, they led to a radical increase in political tension in Poland, which, in the realities of the time, was absolutely not to the liking of the authorities.

In addition, the aforementioned murder of the priest, in October 1984, caused such public pressure that it resulted in a show trial of the officers allegedly responsible for the murder. This, in turn, caused outrage within the Ministry itself. Indeed, its employees recognised that the management would expect them to take extreme measures. But in the event of their implementation, they would refuse to protect them when this became politically unviable. This was to lead to a radical breakdown of loyalty to superiors. The second element to be mentioned was the cases of service officers helping the opposition (Hodysz) and its operational successes, i.e. the breaking of ciphers in the communications of the security service infiltrating the opposition, the so-called “Moat”.

A separate problem was the betrayal of service employees or those working in government administration. In addition to the lesser-known cases of intelligence officers (Bagieński), the aforementioned Zacharski was arrested in the USA and sentenced to life imprisonment as a result of treason. In addition, an officer of the General Staff, Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, worked for the CIA, passing on plans for the imposition of martial law to the United States. Very serious were the desertions of ciphers (Waldemar Mazurkiewicz) or lower-level officers with considerable knowledge of the functioning of the Ministry of the Interior, the army (Jerzy Sumliński) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Walewski). On the other hand, it is not possible to correctly state the total number of betrayals due to the lack of access to the files of the secret services of NATO countries. For this reason, only speculative questions remain as to whether, for example, the documents obtained by Zacharski were not deliberately given to him in order to provoke the Warsaw Pact into an ever-increasing arms race in the 1980s. Similarly, it is not known whether the betrayal of Colonel Kuklinski was not used to see how the US would react to plans to impose martial law.

The last issue that needs to be addressed is that of victims. Looking at the entirety of the functioning of so-called People's Poland in the period 1944-1989, it can be assumed that in the first period of its existence, i.e. roughly until 1956, at least 10,000 people were murdered, while another 20,000 died in camps in the Soviet Union. These were either former resistance soldiers or people considered to be enemies of the people, who were arrested and deported to the USSR. In addition, 400,000 former soldiers were in prisoner-of-war camps. However, all data should be viewed with caution and criticism. This is because there is no chance of definitively verifying the figures in the Russian archives under the current conditions.

Since the consolidation of the communist system, there have been, as already mentioned, regular phases of social discontent in Poland. The protests associated with them generated further casualties. Thus, the protests in Poznan in June 1956 accounted for 70 dead, in Gdansk and Szczecin in December 1970, another 40. The imposition of martial law in December 1981 meant a minimum of 40 deaths from clashes and at least 15,000 arrested in various forms. If one adds to this the trauma and suffering of bystanders such as family members, the estimate of all victims of the security apparatus is as high as one million people. In addition, mention should have been made of the results of the work of parliamentary committees after 1989 indicating at least 100 unexplained deaths in which the secret services could most probably have been involved. This leads to the question of what happened to the special services after 1989 and during the transition itself.

Poland's security apparatus after 1989

The breakthrough of 1989 was the moment when, regardless of all the problems, the secret services reached the maximum of their capabilities. Since the 1980s they had a stable leadership with extensive knowledge of the opposition. They retained access and control over files, largely controlling their destruction. General Kiszczak remained Minister of the Interior until the early 1990s. The changes that were made included the introduction of deputy ministers associated with the opposition, such as the later head of the secret services, Krzysztof Kozłowski, the organisation of cooperation with the secret services of NATO countries, mainly American and British as well, but also the assessment of the suitability of old cadres for the new services. In fact, as of 1990, the Office of State Protection (UOP) was created, which was a combination of intelligence and counterintelligence. Nevertheless, it remained a part of the Interior Ministry until 2002. Thus, the success of the old services was that they avoided a political decision, e.g. to dissolve the security apparatus in its entirety.

Independently of the reception and gradual training of new employees by old officers, a so-called screening was introduced from 1990 onwards. It was supposed to determine whether a given officer should continue working for the services or not. The aforementioned process became one of the most controversial stages in the transformation of the security apparatus.

The clearance theoretically applied to 24,000 employees of the Ministry of the Interior. However, if anyone was unwilling to approach them, they would leave with no repercussions. Of the old management staff of the Ministry, which numbered 137 people, only 20 are still there. More than 90 per cent of those working in the departments dealing with combating the Opposition and the Church left of their own accord. 

The verification process involved 14,034 people. There were 10,439 positive and 3,595 negative opinions of all those who underwent verification. For the most part, the structure of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services has been preserved. Only those officers who had a reputation in opposition circles for being persecutors of opposition members were dismissed.

At the local level, there were 48 provincial qualification commissions. There was also a capital qualification commission for the city of Warsaw. Persons associated with Solidarity or enjoying public confidence chaired the provincial commissions. The commissions included the commanders of the provincial police forces, representatives of the head of the UOP, representatives of the police trade union, members of parliament and senators. In addition, there was a central commission for the consideration of appeals.

But the nature of the clearing procedure built the main problem. The Members of the councils had to assess individual people on the basis of the personnel files that were made available to them, which had already been properly cleaned up and contained very little personal data. It was difficult to form an opinion about a person on this basis. It was necessary to know his reports and the records of his cases. And the committees didn't even see them.

The opposition was not prepared for this kind of verification. The Officers knew that the Opposition was going to testify. Only another officer, not an opposition member, can assess the usefulness of an officer in the secret service. In addition, countries like the USA certainly expected the preservation of the Special Services Corps, which was also crucial for the new democratic government in Poland after 1989.

In general, the lustration went favourably not only for the intelligence and counterintelligence services and the military special services located in the armed forces. But, as mentioned, about half of the former service personnel refused to continue working for the Interior Ministry. This caused significant risks for the state, as they had vast knowledge of, for example, agents in the opposition. Thus, they could have shared this knowledge with foreign intelligence or used it for criminal activities.

Irrespective of the fact that it is not possible, due to lack of access to documents, to make a full analysis of the activities of the secret services in Poland after 1989, it should be pointed out that, as in other countries, its work became a combination of operational and political successes and failures. Former officers working for the new services, on the one hand, arrested persons suspected of spying for Russia, but also for Germany or the USA. It is possible to prove that Polish intelligence evacuated CIA operatives from Iraq. On the other hand, former officers have repeatedly been accused of trying to bring down politicians. And the most important of such allegations, concerning the accusation in 1995 that the Polish prime minister collaborated with Russian intelligence, ended in 2002 with radical institutional changes and the division of the services into two organisations responsible for domestic and foreign intelligence.

Accounting for crimes committed by the services during the communist era was also a problem. An unprofessional attempt to expose the agent past of politicians ended in 1992 with the fall of the government. However, this still did not solve the problem. It was not until 1997 that the so-called Institute of National Remembrance was established. It took over the files of the secret services, conducting research into crimes and checking the credibility of statements made by candidates for political office. The fact of being an agent was not punishable. What was punishable was the concealment of information about being an agent. And this resulted in, among other things, a ban on holding public office.

The research and legal challenge in this context remains the reliability of the surviving files and the fact that the presumption of being an agent is sometimes an element of accusations in political struggles. Besides, depending on one's current political orientation and service to a party, proving work as an agent was not necessarily stigmatising. This raised questions about the sense of the vetting procedure. Equally controversial, especially for the victims, was the fact that neither Jaruzelski nor Kiszczak bore judicial responsibility because of the supervision of the services in the People's Republic of Poland that they exercised. Access to files at the Institute of National Remembrance until 2015 was difficult and there was no full transparency. In addition, ideas of generally punishing former functionaries, e.g. by limiting their pensions, were overturned by the courts, which did not recognise the concept of collective responsibility. Thus, until historical debates are the basis of political struggle in Poland, any reliable analysis of the actual activities of the secret services in Poland before 1989 will not be possible. Above all because of incomplete historical sources and the personal attitude of most members of the political class towards the subject.

Was there a place for Latin America somewhere in all this? Unfortunately not, apart from indications in the diaries of former Polish intelligence officers who were supposed to have fought both Russian intelligence and drug cartels in Cuba or South American countries after 1989. Perhaps in a few decades, if access to the files is guaranteed, it will be possible to find out more about this.